

**SECRET**

Executive Registry
77-7745/2


26 OCT 1977

*Akiy J*  
*JF*

*1 3 NOV 1977*

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/Conventional Forces  
 FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
 SUBJECT: Letter to General Dixon

1. Attached is a draft letter to General Dixon on pushing to revive the Mitre study (which I believe I have in my files) which tried to move from static indicators towards more dynamic ones regarding the balance of air capabilities in Europe. I'd appreciate your looking at whether we could or should employ Mitre or anyone else to improve on that methodology and use the latest information available.
2. I appreciated the efforts in your paper for me to do something of that, such as the employment of the Soviets "combat capability rating." We don't know how they got that but they must have done something such as I'm talking about. (I do wonder how you go from their capability rating chart which shows the F-4E superior to anything but Flogger and Fencer, the F-104/105 equal to everything else, and the F-14/F-15 at least 2 1/2 times better than anything the Soviets have passed us.) Clearly, you've done the mathematics properly but we must have an awful lot of F-100s around, which is the only aircraft on the chart of lesser capability than some of the Soviets'.
3. Thanks.




STANSFIELD TURNER

Attachment

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

(

*Akiy J*

**SECRET**

D R A F T

General Robert J. Dixon, USAF  
Commander, Headquarters Tactical  
Air Command  
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia 23665

Dear Bob,

At the risk of having my head chopped off (!), I'm enclosing a very brief study memorandum that just came across my desk and which brought to mind one of the comments in your famous letter to me of 9 August. You said in the third paragraph, "For example, they fly more training sorties than our pilots and receive more simulator training." The attached study does not dispute that but does contend that the individual duration of training flights is shorter and that there are fewer "combat-related training events."

On another point you make about devoting more attention to a short/no-warning Pact attack, we are about to complete a fairly extensive study on this subject. It considerably downplays the emphasis we've had in recent years on the short or no-warning attack. We simply believe that the disadvantages to the Soviets of going off in 24-48 hours are not compensated by the initial surprise and gains that they might make. I believe Dutch Huyser's recent work has come to a similar conclusion. I'll send you a copy of that study when it is finally printed. (NOTE FOR [REDACTED] Please make a tickler on that.)

S E C R E T

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001700090006-2

2

Finally, in terms of the overall balance of capabilities, I must say that I still have the impression that we are considerably ahead in the potential for delivering ordnance on targets and enemy territory. I simply believe that despite their improved avionics, range/payload and weapons, most of the Warsaw Pact's tactical aircraft would have considerable difficulty delivering ordnance against NATO targets in a hostile air defense environment without being under positive ground control. Clearly, this would be very inhibiting to them. Perhaps I am overly influenced by the Mitre study we discussed because it stressed this point of positive control and of accuracy of delivery. I'm still of the feeling that it would be wise to update that study or do one using similar methodology. It seems to me we need some more dynamic indicator of the comparative capabilities of NATO and Pact air forces than just the usual static indicators of numbers of aircraft tempered with data on range/payload, avionics and weaponry.

As always, all the best.

Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001700090006-2

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.		DATE	

**TOP SECRET**

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Handle Via

**COMINT**

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to  
those approved for the following specific activities:

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



**Warning Notice**

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001700090006-2  
(Security Classification)

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001700090006-2

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M00165A001700090006-2

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 26/10/71
TO: <i>NIO/CF</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:  <i>See DCI's memo to you, enclosed.</i> <i>Thurs. 26 Oct.</i>		
FROM: <i>SA/1001</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.